Anesthesia enters the depth-psychology corpus along two distinct but often convergent axes. The first is the classical psychopathological axis, originating with Charcot and elaborated exhaustively by Pierre Janet, in which hysterical anesthesia designates not a pharmacological state but a dissociative suspension of sensory integration — a failure of ‘personal perception’ in which elementary sensations persist subcortically while failing to be assimilated into unified self-awareness. Janet’s lectures demonstrate that this anesthesia is mobile, suggestible, and without anatomical coherence, marking it as a mental rather than neurological phenomenon. The second axis is the somatic-defensive axis, developed by Nijenhuis and informed by ethological models, in which anesthesia-analgesia constitutes a measurable somatoform dissociative symptom cluster strongly predictive of dissociative disorder and correlated with histories of physical and sexual abuse — understood as analogous to total submission responses in prey animals. A third, more clinical-philosophical axis appears in Damasio, who treats pharmacological anesthesia as a mechanism that distorts body-mapping and thereby suspends feeling and consciousness, and in Ferenczi, who connects narcotic anesthesia to patients’ defensive avoidance of traumatic pain. Hillman contributes an archetypal-developmental counterpoint, reading the sensory diminishment of old age as a natural anesthesia that paradoxically intensifies imaginative acuity. Across these traditions, anesthesia functions as a privileged site for interrogating the relationship between sensation, consciousness, selfhood, and trauma.