The concept of analysts’ blind spots occupies a foundational position in the epistemology of depth-psychological practice, naming those sectors of the analyst’s own psychic life that, unexamined, distort perception of the patient and corrupt the therapeutic field. The genealogy is precise: Jung credits Freud with the ‘invaluable discovery that analysts too have their complexes and consequently one or two blind spots which act as so many prejudices,’ while simultaneously claiming priority for the demand that the analyst be analysed. From this double origin, the concept radiates in two directions. The first is clinical-structural: blind spots are the functional consequence of unresolved personal complexes, inferior typological functions, or unmetabolised countertransference, all of which cause the analyst to project rather than perceive. The second is ethical-institutional: their existence mandates the training analysis, ongoing self-scrutiny, and the analyst’s willingness to remain a fellow participant rather than an omniscient authority. Ella Sharpe’s formulation — that to acknowledge blind spots ‘is only to say that he remains a human being’ — marks the mature post-Freudian consensus, in which the question shifts from eradication to recognition and use. Jacoby, Wiener, and Ogden each elaborate the mechanisms by which unacknowledged blind spots generate projective distortion, therapeutic misalliance, and countertransferential enactment, while locating the remedy in the analyst’s sustained reflexive engagement with the unconscious dimensions of the therapeutic encounter.