Being and Time

Name: Being and Time
Author: Martin Heidegger

Being and Time is a work by Martin Heidegger (1927).

Core claims

Being and Time does not ask what exists but how existence discloses itself through time, thereby dismantling the entire Western metaphysical habit of treating Being as a static object available for inspection—a move that makes it the unacknowledged precondition for every depth-psychological claim about the “reality of the psyche.”
Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as “being-in-the-world” prefigures and exceeds Jung’s “esse in anima” by refusing to grant the psyche a separate interior domain: for Heidegger, there is no soul-container distinct from world, which is precisely why Giegerich argues that Jungian psychology must become “sublated” if it is to honor its own Notion.
The analysis of “being-toward-death” as the structure that individuates Dasein is not an existentialist platitude but the philosophical chassis on which Hillman later mounted his entire archetypal psychology of the underworld—making Being and Time the unacknowledged ur-text of post-Jungian thanatology.

How does Giegerich’s critique of imaginal psychology as “blind to historical time” in The Soul’s Logical Life extend or diverge from Heidegger’s claim in Being and Time that Dasein’s temporality is the horizon for understanding Being?
In what ways does Hillman’s archetypal thanatology in Suicide and the Soul both depend on and transgress Heidegger’s analysis of being-toward-death—and what does this tension reveal about the boundary between ontology and psychology?
How does Peterson’s concept of the “Middle Voice” as a stance forged under convergence in The Iron Thūmos relate to Heidegger’s account of Angst as the mood that discloses Dasein’s groundlessness and opens the possibility of authentic resoluteness?