---
title: "Jung's Alchemical Philosophy: Psyche and the Mercurial Play of Image and Idea"
author: "Stanton Marlan"
year: 2022
shelf: "the-psyche"
purchase_url: "https://bookshop.org/search?keywords=Marlan+Jungs+Alchemical+Philosophy"
in_stock: false
related: ["marlan-black-sun-alchemy", "marlan-jung-alchemical-imagination", "marlan-fire-in-the-stone", "giegerich-souls-logical-life", "hillman-alchemical-psychology", "jung-mysterium-coniunctionis"]
collections: []
content_type: "book-commentary"
key_takeaways:
  - "Marlan reads the alchemists as philosophers whose goal, the Philosophers' Stone, was a philosophical substance. He follows binaries such as chemistry and alchemy, image and idea, and soul and spirit through historians, Jungians and philosophers, and concludes that none of them resolves into a simple unity. The Stone, the stone that is no stone, names a complex unity."
  - "The book sets James Hillman, who keeps to the image, beside Wolfgang Giegerich, who follows Hegel toward thought and the soul's logical life. Marlan credits both and argues that Giegerich's sublation leaves an unassimilable remnant behind, an idea that began with a patient's drawing of a sun with a black center and that returns in the human, all-too-human life of the consulting room."
  - "Reading Hegel with Rockmore, De Boer, Desmond, Verene, Magnus and Žižek, Marlan treats Absolute Knowing as absolute for a historical human being, and he adds a difference between unity and difference to Hegel's unity of unity and difference. In that reading image and idea give rise to each other in a circular, mercurial play, and the Stone and Jung's Self become a chaosmos, a unity that keeps its multiplicity."
references:
  - "Marlan, S. (2022). *Jung's Alchemical Philosophy: Psyche and the Mercurial Play of Image and Idea*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003215905"
  - "Marlan, S. (2005). *The Black Sun: The Alchemy and Art of Darkness*. Texas A&M University Press."
  - "Jung, C. G. (1970). *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (G. Adler, Ed.; R. F. C. Hull, Trans.; Collected Works, Vol. 14). Princeton University Press."
  - "Hillman, J. (2010). *Alchemical Psychology* (Uniform Edition of the Writings of James Hillman, Vol. 5). Spring Publications."
  - "Giegerich, W. (1998). *The Soul's Logical Life: Towards a Rigorous Notion of Psychology*. Peter Lang."
  - "Giegerich, W. (2008). The unassimilable remnant: What is at stake? A dispute with Stanton Marlan. In S. Marlan (Ed.), *Archetypal Psychologies: Reflections in Honor of James Hillman* (pp. 193–223). Spring Journal Books."
  - "Kant, I. (1996). *Critique of Pure Reason* (W. S. Pluhar, Trans.). Hackett."
  - "Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). *Phenomenology of Spirit* (A. V. Miller, Trans.). Oxford University Press."
  - "De Boer, K. (2010). *On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative*. Palgrave Macmillan."
glossary_terms:
  - "philosophers-stone"
  - "mercurius"
  - "self"
  - "coniunctio"
  - "sol-niger"
  - "image"
scholar_prompts:
  - "Marlan faults Giegerich for leaving coagulatio out of his account of the opus and reading it as a dissolution of Mercurius, and Giegerich answers that coagulation is not essential to the overall purpose of the work. Using *The Soul's Logical Life* and Hillman's *Alchemical Psychology*, how would each side read coagulatio, and what follows for clinical work?"
  - "Marlan adopts Karin de Boer's idea of a tragic negativity that cannot be fully sublated. How does it compare with the darkness Marlan described in *The Black Sun*, and does it change how an analyst should think about the end of an analysis?"
  - "Marlan asks whether Hegel's self-consciousness and Jung's Mercurius duplex might be the concept and the image of one circular, dialectical structure. How does Jung's *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, which Marlan calls Jung's fullest treatment of the problem of opposites, support or resist that parallel?"
seo_title: "Jung's Alchemical Philosophy by Stanton Marlan: The Philosophers' Stone, Hegel and the Play of Image and Idea | Seba.Health"
seo_description: "Commentary on Stanton Marlan's reading of the Philosophers' Stone through Jung, Hillman, Giegerich, Kant and Hegel, and the play of image and idea."
---

**The Stone That Is No Stone**

Stanton Marlan, a Jungian analyst who teaches clinical psychology at Duquesne University, takes up the goal of the alchemical work, the Philosophers' Stone. Scholars have mostly dismissed the Stone as a fantasy of the old alchemists, he notes, and historians of science read alchemy as a precursor to chemistry. Jung saw a dual face in it, a laboratory attempt to transform matter and a spiritual quest to transform the soul. Marlan proposes that the alchemical philosophers "should be considered as philosophers working out a philosophical perspective," and that their goal was a philosophical substance.

That proposal opens a long list of divides, among them chemistry and alchemy, phenomena and noumena, thought and being, image and idea, and soul and spirit. The verdict, given in the preface and repeated in the conclusion, is that "none of these divides can easily, if at all, be resolved into a simple unity or oneness." The alchemists called the Stone *lithos ou lithos*, the "stone that is no stone," and Marlan takes the saying as his guide: the unity of the Stone has to be understood as a complex one.

The book follows three versions of the goal. For Jung the Self was a modern psychological equivalent of the Stone. James Hillman replaced the Self with the less metaphysical notion of soul, and Wolfgang Giegerich, by way of Hegel, put spirit and the soul's logical life at the center.

**The Split in the Alchemical Imagination**

The first chapter, "Philosophical tensions in the historiography of alchemy," sets the history of science against the history of the human spirit. Mircea Eliade held that alchemy was a sacred discipline first and that chemistry was born from its disintegration. Lawrence Principe and William Newman reject Jung's and Eliade's spiritual reading, and Marlan calls their position a brand of historical and scientific positivism. He follows the scholars who answer them: Hereward Tilton, who shows how they misquote Jung on laboratory work, Florin George Caliăn, Wouter Hanegraaff and Aaron Cheak, for whom alchemy was always twofold, "gold-making and god-making." Marlan's own complaint is that the debate leaves its philosophical presuppositions unexamined.

Chapter 2, "The eye of the winged serpent," begins with the frontispiece of Michael Maier's *Tripus aureus*, which Jung reproduced as the "double face of alchemy." A library stands on one side and a laboratory on the other, and between them a furnace heats a flask that holds a winged serpent. Marlan reads the creature as a *monstrum*, a premature conjunction, and sees in the picture the modern habit of siding with one room or the other. In Jung's description Mercurius "is metallic yet liquid, matter yet spirit, cold yet fiery, poison yet healing draught." The chapter retells Jung's confrontation with the unconscious and the moment in the *Rosarium philosophorum* when he felt he "had stumbled upon the historical counterpart" of his psychology of the unconscious.

Chapter 3, "Benign and monstrous conjunctions," follows the stranger images of union: the hermaphrodite, the Gnostic Abraxas of the *Seven Sermons of the Dead*, the monster Mercurius, and finally *Mysterium Coniunctionis*. Marlan quotes Edward Edinger's judgment that "[t]he living experience of the Self is a monstrosity."

**Classical Jungians and Two Revisionists**

Chapter 4 credits Marie-Louise von Franz and Edward Edinger with more than they claimed as commentators on Jung. Edinger's *Anatomy of the Psyche* organized the opus around seven operations, from *calcinatio* to *coniunctio*, with a method he called "cluster thinking." Marlan values that order and warns that translating alchemy into medical and classical Jungian categories "runs the risk of oversimplification and static reification."

Chapter 5, "Innovations, criticisms, and developments," turns to the revisionists. Hillman moved from a psychology of alchemy to an alchemical psychology founded on imagination, and he wanted alchemy met with "the least possible intrusion of metaphysics." Giegerich, shaped by Hegel and Heidegger, treats the image as thought still held in pictorial form and holds that a rigorous psychology must go beyond the imaginal. Chapter 6 sets out where the two agree and diverge, and its table pairs Hillman's images, semantics and sticking with the image against Giegerich's logic, syntax and making the cut.

**The Remnant That Will Not Be Sublated**

Chapters 7 to 9 carry Marlan's criticism of Giegerich, whose psychology proper he describes as syntactic, logical and thoughtful in place of semantic, ontological and imaginal. Marlan asks what it leaves behind. Giegerich has said that he never reached true gold in his own work, and in *What Is Soul?* he asks the therapist to keep "one leg in psychology and one leg in practical reality." For Marlan that admission brings back the human, all-too-human person whom the radical cut seemed to banish.

The remnant itself comes from the consulting room. Chapter 8, "The problem of the remainder," recalls the patient who first gave Marlan the idea. She felt a dark ball in her chest, and in active imagination she drew "a brilliant sun with a dense black center and long fibrous tentacles." No interpretation seemed to do justice to the image, and it left him asking whether such darkness could ever be sublated. Chapter 9, "The alchemical stove," pictures Jung cooking on a back burner while Hillman and Giegerich boil up front: "if Hillman emphasizes wax (the body of the image), Giegerich thinks water (the solutio of its body)." Against a sublation that would leave nothing over, Marlan sets the alchemists' *lumen naturae*, which Jung called "the light of darkness itself."

**Kant's Limit and Hegel's Absolute**

Giegerich answered the article behind chapter 9 with "The Unassimilable Remnant: What Is at Stake?: A Dispute with Stanton Marlan," and Marlan says the criticisms moved him to reconsider Kant and Hegel. Chapter 10 seeks the philosophical basis of the remnant in Kant's thing-in-itself. Jung took from Kant the line between what appears and what cannot be known, and Marlan agrees with Paul Bishop that Jung's psychology keeps exceeding it. Hegel's Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* refuses to stop at the thing-in-itself, and Tom Rockmore's reading makes knowledge historical, indexed to time and place.

Chapter 11, "A reflection on the black sun and Jung’s notion of self," asks for "a self that is not a Self." Marlan borrows Heidegger's "sous rature" to picture the Self under erasure and takes Hillman's waxy Stone, which can "receive endless literalizations without being permanently impressed," as a model for it. He weighs Giegerich's Self, real only "over the ego’s dead body," and Donald Verene's account of Absolute Knowing as an "ironic and melancholic wisdom."

Chapter 12, "Spirit and soul," draws on Karin de Boer's *On Hegel*, which finds a tragic strand in Hegel beside the dialectical one. Her "tragic negativity" fits Marlan's first concerns about the black sun, and with William Desmond and Edward Casey he argues for tarrying with the negative and for a philosophy that keeps company with psychology. Chapter 13, "The self, the absolute, the stone," compares Jung's Self with Hegel's Absolute Knowing and, with Rockmore, reads the absolute as absolute for a human being in history. After Slavoj Žižek's paradox that the spirit is a bone, Marlan suggests "we might also say that spirit is a stone," and he names the Stone that holds chaos and cosmos together chaosmos.

**Image and Idea**

The epilogue sums up the two revisionists, each of whom makes one term primary: "Hillman sticks to the image and Giegerich absolutizes thought in the spirit of Hegel." Marlan leans toward the image and says he found a way of reading Hegel in which imagination is not surpassed by thought or spirit. Hegel described unity as a unity of unity and difference. Marlan adds a difference between unity and difference, so that the Stone and Jung's Self stay a multiplicity as well as a unity. This is the mercurial play of the subtitle: "Images then give rise to thought and thought gives rise to images." The result, in his account, is a philosophical illumination within life and the depths of the soul, with no absolute spirit rising above them.

**From The Black Sun to This Book**

Marlan says where the argument began. *The Black Sun: The Alchemy and Art of Darkness* (2005) dealt with an image of darkness that "would not dissolve, go away, or be lifted up," and that darkness, with its odd luminosity, led him on to the Philosophers' Stone. Portions of chapter 11 are modified from that book, chapter 9 revises his Spring article "From the Black Sun to the Philosopher’s Stone," and Giegerich's reply to that article shapes chapter 10. The new book carries the clinical question of the earlier one into philosophy: whether a darkness that resists consciousness can be sublated. The back cover names *C.G. Jung and the Alchemical Imagination: Passages into the Mysteries of Psyche and Soul* (2021) among his other books on psychology and alchemy. On this shelf the book belongs beside Jung's *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, Hillman's *Alchemical Psychology* and Giegerich's *The Soul's Logical Life*, whose views of the Stone it sets side by side.
